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TH[ ST.L.TE OF UTAH

SThTE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent.

Case No. 18998

vs.
TIMOTHY AND MILDRED LAIRBY,
Defendants-Appellants.
BRIEF OF
SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY
DENYING
RIGHT OF CONFRONThTION AS
GUARANTEED BY THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION,
SIXTH AMEtlDMENT, AND THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 12.
The right to cross examine, embodied within the right
of confrontation, is an invaluable right guaranteed by Article I,
Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution and in the Sixth
hmendment of the United States Constitution.
In the leading case of Davis vs. Alaska, 415 US 308,
94 s.ct. 1105 (1974), the importance of one's right to cross
examination was explained as follows:
"Cross examination is the principal means by which the
believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony
is tested .... We have recognized that the exposure of a
witness'
in testifying is a proper and important
function of the constitutionally protected right of cross
exar:,1r,al1un.

1

'

This court stressed the accu,,,,,ci'" r J ,Jht of crossexamination in State v. Chesnut,

6.'l

12.!l' (Ut. l98CJ)

where Justice Maughn, writing for a unanimous court, stated
as follows:
"The right of cross-examination is an integral part of the
right of confrontation, which is guaranteed by Article I,
Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah and the Sixth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
The cross-examination of a witness, testifying against
the accused, provides a means of attacking his credibility
and thus the substance of his testimony (cites omitted).
Furthermore, Section 78-24-1 provides that in every case
the credibility of the witness may be drawn in question by
his motives.
The exposure of a witness' motivation in
testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination (cites
omitted).
A trial court should be particularly solicitous
of cross-examination intended to disclose bias or prejudice."
(Id., at 1233).
See also Hutchings v. State, 518 P.2d 767
Anderson, 612 P.2d 78

(Alaska 1974); State v.

(Ut. 1980); State v. Maestas,

564 P.2d 1386

(Ut. 1977).
Partiality, or any acts, relationships or motives
reasonably likely to produce it, may be proved to impeach credibility (3A Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourne rev.)
Hale, Bias As Affecting Credibility,

Sections 943-969;

1 Hastings L.J. 1 (1949))

Facts which show bias are not "collateral," and the crossexaminer is not required to "take the answer of the witness,"
but may call other witnesses to prove them (State v. Day,
S.W.2d 1183, 1184; Smith v. U.S.,
Smith v. Hornkohl,

95

283 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1960)

90 N.W.2d 347 (Neb. 1958)).

Where a trial court has unduly restricted a defendant
in the exercise of his constitutional right of cross-exan,irat1on,

-
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the "hdrIT.less error" :-·t aradrd compels reversal,
rev1ew1ng court cari cJ<-clan·
beyond a r<.:asonablc doubt
Chapmar. v. California,

unless the

ucl1<cf that the error was harmless

rl

(State v. Chesnut,

386 u.

18,

supra, at 1233;

24; 87 s.ct. 824,

828 (1967))

Appellants were r<.:peatcdly denied their constitutional
rights of confrontation and cross-examination in the trial court.
On one such occasion (Tr.28), defense counsel, Lionel Farr, was
attempting to cross-examir.e Wanda Lairby as to bias, interest
and motive to fabricate,

as follows:

QUESTION:
"And at the t1:-c.e of the divorce wasn't there a
question of custody raised?"
ANSWER:

"At the time of the divorce?"

QUESTION:
ANSWER:

"Yes."
"No."

QUESTION:

"Isn't there still a custody hearing pending?"

MR.
FARR:
"Your Honor,
material to the case."
THE COURT:

I object that this is not

"Objection is sustained."

MR. LIONEL FARR:
"I think that goes to the question of
bias or prejudice, your Honor, as to custody, should she have
custody of these children, she would have a motive here and
so forth."
THE COURT:
"As the matter now stands,
there is any evidence of motive."

I don't know that

Similar denials of Appellants' constitutional rights
of confrontation and cross-examination occurred throughout the
trial when defense counsel attempted to cross-examine Lisa Lairby
(Tr. 172-173), Dr. William Palmer (Tr.
Lisa's grandmother

(Tr.

238), Violet Jones,

333, 334, 335), and Richard Long (Tr. 428,

429, n1 I.
-
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The court also unduly rest

t i r\, ,,

d• t

t·r

counsel

1

questioning when he attempted to at\iKf: tliL· crcd1l1l1ty and
establish the bias of the State's witnesses through his own
witnesses

(Tr. bottom 531,

Lairby); 641, 642

top

botton• 532,

533 (Mildred

(Timothy Lairby)).

The prejudicial violations of Appellants' constitutional rights of confrontation, outlined above,

constitute

reversible error according to the standard established in
Chapman v. California, supra, and adopted by this court in
State v. Chesnut, supra.
POINT II
APPELLANTS WERE DENIED THEIR RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION.
Appellants'

right to effective assistance of counsel

is guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution as well as Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State
Constitution.

Until recently,

the common law standard of ±_lleffec-

tive assistance of counsel was that "on appeal it fT'USt appear
that counsel's lack of diligence of competence reduced the trial
to a farce or a sham."
State v. McNicol,
P.2d 69

(People v. Ibarra,

554 P.2d 203

(Ut. 1978)).

386 P.2d 487

(Cal. 196c

(Ut. 1976); State v. Pierrcr.,

583

Due to widespread criticism that the

"farce or sham" standard was not stringer.t enough to protect
an accused's right to effective assistance of counsel, a new
standard has been adopted by this court and by the maJority of

- 4 -

courts throughout the
590 P.

859

(Cal.

r,<Jt1c;r

l

Codiannr,a v. MorrLs, V,r,
the new standard, which

('i"'L,

for example, People v. Pope,

(er, bar 1 c).)
l!IJl

l'.:d
1s

In the recent case of

(Ut. 1983) this court adopted

as follows:

"The Sixth Amer:drrient demands that defense counsel exercise
the skill, judqNont and diligence of a reasonably competent
defense attorney."
(emphasis added)
In adopting this new staLdard this Court stated that it "includes
all of the requirements the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
identified in its recent redefinition of the constitutional
requirements of effective assistance of counsel."

The case to

which this Court referred was Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275, 278
(10th Cir. 1980)

(en bane).

The Tenth Circuit took the opportuLity to further
clarify the standard it laid down in Dyer, supra, in the case of
U.S. v. Porterfield, 624 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1980), at 124, 125,
where it stated as follows:
"The government argues that a showing of prejudice is
essential, but we disagree.
In passing, we mentioned
(in the
opinion) that the defendant in Dyer v. Crisp
had not suffered prejudice.
It is not accurate, however,
to conclude that 'prejudice' is a second tier in the test
of incompetency.
Reasonable diligence and skill is the
test!
It would be a mockery in this case to say that the
defendant was clearly guilty and that the incompetence of
counsel made no difference. Where, as here, the incompetence of counsel is pervasive, the defendant ought not to
be required to prove prejudice on top of the inadequacy.
The burden should be on the government to establish the lack
of prejudice.
See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98
s.ct. 1173 (1978) .... We need only conclude that the trial
counsel's representation of the defendant failed to meet
the requirements of the Constitution and constituted a
failure to exercise the reasonable skill and diligence of
a reasonably competent defense lawyer. We need not measure
the extent of the prejudice or the extent of lack of
effc:ct1vc assistance of counsel."
(Id., at 124, 125.)
-
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As stated above, once the

lkfc·1,cLnd

of establishing ineffective assistance·

c-if

hi.le

1r»l

his burdc·r.

,.c,unscl, tlw Lu1·dcn

should be upon the government to prove lack of prejudire due tu
such ineffective assistance.
Finer,

See also Bazelon, 42 U.Cin.L.Rev. l:

58 Cornell L.Rev. 1077, 1093.
Ineffective assistance of appellant's counsel in the

court below was apparent from the moment trial began.

When the

court asked if defense counsel was ready to proceed on the
morning of trial, defense attorney Lionel Farr indicated he was
not prepared because he had not had any opportunity to interview
or depose two of the State's witnesses (Tr. 122).

When the court

invited defense counsel to make an opening statement, he reserved
that right until the opening of his case in chief (Tr. 7, 8).

At

the opening of the Defendant's case in chief, defense counsel
made his opening statement (Tr. 469-471), which was, in part, as
follows:
"Lady and gentlemen of the jury and Your Honor and counsel
and everybody else I'm supposed to acknowledge, comes time
now for the defense to present evidence as to what they feel
is important in this case •.•. As you have heard the evidence,
we intend now to present the defense that we have mainly
because of the facts that until you have made your decision,
the defendants that I represent are not guilty and I hope
that you have not made that decision at this point.
That
is the main inquiry I make at the beginning, that you be
able to withhold any feeling of decision whatsoever until
we have had a chance to make our consideration and that
you were given that opportunity at that time to decide
whether or not you could go through the whole trial and
withhold any judgment whatsoever.
It may have been hard
to do.
I don't know.
For me it is hard sometimes lo JUmp
to a conclusion.
"But anyway, our case now will be to present the defcnJ0r.ts,
let them speak.
I don't think we're going to try and claim
-
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silence and hu\'e Y'-"I .cf•"ccilcd" whether or not their silence

rncd.n.s

ar1ylh1r,r:.

"And also character 1-11lrH•:,;--ec;. We try to--we will present
basically tht' def en."' th0L U1c-sc thir.gs did not happen,
that--

"The Court:
to be.

No.

Just tell us what you think it's going

"Mr. Lionel Farr: Well, I guess just to make a statement
to try to introduce myself ar.d try to establish some
rapport with you so that I can feel that I'm part of
the program, too.
But that is the limitation of my
opening statement.
I can't go into evidence.
"The Court:
Mr. Farr, you can tell the evidence, what you
think the evidence is go"ng to be, but don't comrnent on it.
"Mr. Lionel Farr: Well, we'll let the witnesses testify
then, and that will be--that will be the same, Judge.
Thank you."
The above excerpt shows that Appellants were denied the opportunity to present the jury with an intelligent, cohesive description of their case in the rnanner to be expected of a reasonably
competent defense attorney.
Ineffective assistance of counsel was also evidenced
during the State's case in chief, when defense counsel failed
to make a motion to strike the testimony of four of the State's
witnesses.

The State called Craig Duvall, a police officer from

the Provo Police Departrnent, Christine Swanson, a clinical
psychologist for Granite School District and once employed at
Primary Children's Medical Center; Finia Feuiaki, an employee
of the Divis1or. of Family Services in Provo; and Kelly Powers,
a protective service worker from the State Department of Social

- 7 -

Services, Division of Field Services.
officials testified that thcy had seen aLJ talked
Beyond that,

they offered no probative

of the allegations.

tu

Lisa

as to the trutl.

Although a reasonably competent defense

attorney would have made a motion to strike the testimony of each
of these four witnesses and requested an admonition that the
jury disregard the fact that these witnesses were called,
Appellants received no assistance in this regard (Tr. 179-250).
Ineffective assistance of Defendants' trial court
counsel was also apparent when defense counsel attempted to
impeach a State's witness based on prior inconsistent staterner,ts
from the preliminary hearing (Tr. 391,

411,

418).

Unfortunately,

defense counsel had never requested transcripts of the preliminary hearing and consequently he was unable to use prior inconsistent statements from that hearing to impeach any of the
State's witnesses.
Another example of the ineffective assistance of
counsel afford to Defendants is evidenced by the following
dialogue (Tr. 445), which defense counsel allowed to take place
without objection:
(redirect examination by Mr. Paul Farr)
QUESTION:
"Detective Blunck, did you ever ask Mildred
Lairby if she would talk to you?"
ANSWER:
QUESTION:
ANSWER:
attorney."

"I did one time."
"What was her response?"
"That she wanted to talk and consult with her

- 8 -

Not only did the above dialogue proceed without objection by
defense counsel, defense cour:sel reinforced the highly prejudicial
inference from this dialogue on recross-examination (Tr. 447),
when he asked:
QUESTION:
"So, after the Miranda warning was given
she did not say anything to you; is that correct?"
ANSWER:

"No sir.

She requested her attorney."

As noted later by the trial court (Tr. 685), testimony that an
accused has exercised his constitutional rights is ordinarily
reversible error and would have resulted in a mistrial had there
been an objection by defense counsel.
Defense counsel also failed to exercise the skill,
judgment and diligence of a reasonably cor:-,petent defense attorney
in eliciting character witness testimony (Tr. 481-583).

Although

it will subsequently be argued in this memorandum that some
admissible character witness testimony did come into evidence,
the prejudice resulting from defense counsel's inept approach to
examination of these character witnesses is manifest in the
court's withdrawal of a jury instruction on character evidence
(Tr. 673)
Further ineffective assistance of counsel occurred
when defense counsel allowed a highly prejudicial document to be
admitted into evidence without ever having seen, or even requested
to see, the document (Tr. 627).
Additionally, Defendants were denied their right to
effective assistance of counsel during closing arguments (Tr. 7037 26) .

Defense counsel's closing argument fell far below the level
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of quality expected from a re<Jsor,,-jl I y ''""!,I· r:t ckfcnsc att 01 r.• Y.
Although not exhe>usl1vv,

the

above C'Xor•.1·1«,; arc

:uff 1 _

0

cient to illustrate the pervasive inc·ffcct1vc a;;c-:istancC; of
received by Appellants in the court below.

A r c· v 1

cw of l h c tr i a J

transcript reveals that not only was defense counsel's ass1star.cl
ineffective as measured by the new "reasonably competent defcn
attorney" standard,

the assistance was also ineffective accordir.g

to the less stringent "farce or sham" test.

While Appellants

maintain that they have no burden to show prejudice result1nn
from the ineffective assistance of counsel, the prejudicial
effect is unmistakable.
POINT III
THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY REFUSING TO SECURE
THE ATTENDANCE OF AN OUT-OF-STATE WITNESS
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION
77-21-3.

The Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses
From Without of State in Criminal Proceedings, as adopted in
Arizona

(Ariz. Rev. Statutes Annot. Section 13-4092)

and in Utah (Utah Code Annotated Section 77-21-3,

(1956),

1953),

vests

the Court with authority to compel the attendance of witnesses
located outside the forum state.

The Court is free to invoke

the compulsory process of the Uniform Act in behalf of either
the prosecution or the defense (State v. Leggroan,
(Ut. 1964)).

389 P.26 14:

Furthermore, Article I, Section 12 of the Utah

State Constitution guarantees that "1n criminal proc;ccutions
the accused shall have the right ... to have compulsory process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his owr. behalf .... "
-
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The record show'; that dc·feri: c L'Our.ooel informed the Court of its
desire to call Tracy Lono to testify immediately after learning
that tlie State had decided lier testimony was not useful.
(Tr. 125, 126)

The court erred in disclaiming all authority by

which to compel her attendance, especially in light of the
materiality and relevance of Tracy Long's anticipated testimony.
POINT IV
APPELLANTS WERE Dr:tH CD THEIR RIGHTS TO PRESENT
CHARACTER WITNESS EVIDENCE TO THE JURY, AND
TO A JURY INC:TR\X l lOti ON CHARACTER WITNESS
EVIDENCE.
To be admissible, character witness testimony as to an
accused's reputation must be confined to the particular traits
which are relevant to the offense charged (State v. Thompson,
199 P 161

(Ut. 1921)), and the witness giving such testimony

must have personal knowledge of the general reputation of the
accused in the community in which he resides or has resided
(State v. Thoernke, 92 NW 480
9 4 NW 4 7 2

(I a.

) )

.

(No.Dak.

) ; Halley v. Tichenor,

The "community" in which one lives is

not necessarily a geographical unit, but is rather composed of
those relationships with others which arise where one works,
worships,
White,

shops, relaxes, and lives, as explained in U.S. v.

225 F Supp 514 (D.D.C. 1963), reversed 349 F.2d 965.

See also State v. Miller, 628 P.2d 444 (Or. 1981); State v.
Buckner,

214 NW 2d 164

(Ia. 1979).)

The point in time at which

the accused's character is relevant is at a time at or prior to
the date of the commission of the alleged offense (State v.

-
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Rivera, 612 P.2d 526 (Ha. 198(1); )d_,_s. \·. iiull,
1180 (4th Cir. 1969); People v. lla"cor1L,

lllo,

392

lll", 113:'

(Ill. 1979).)
The record of the proceedings in the trial court bel
reveals that despite defense counsel's inept approach to
admissible character evidence, some admissible character evidence
did come in (Tr. 486, 493 (lines 13-15), 514), therC>by entitling
Defendants to a jury instruction on character evidencC' (character
evidence jury instruction withdrawn over defense counsel's
objection, Tr. 673).

More importantly, however,

the transcript

reveals that the court below unduly restricted the character
evidence sought to be elicited by defense counsel
512, 577).

(Tr. 486, 511,

The ineffective manner with which defense counsel

attempted to lay foundation for character evidence, together with
the court's unduly narrow interpretation of admissible character
witness evidence combined to constitute a denial of Appellants'
rights to present evidence in their own behalf.
POINT V
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN RULING ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY AND IN QUASHING
A SUBPOEt'A. OF APPELLANTS' EXPERT.
During the course of testimony a1ven by Dr. Wi!liaI".
Palmer, a pediatrician, he was allowed

over thr repeated obJe<-

tions of defense counsel

to give his opinion that

had been sexually abused.

(Tr.

226)

Lairby

Although Dr. Palr0r

a physical examination, he expressly stated that no part of h15
opinion was based upon the physical cxarination
- 12 -

(Tr.

22B).

Rather, the opin1or. of !Jr. f·alrrer was admitted as being explicitly
basco on what Lisa LairLy said to him.

(Tr.

The record

229)

reveals that there was no foundation laid as to whether such
words,

phrases or vocabulary was used by Lisa Lairby are

typically relied upon by others in Dr. Palmer's field of expertise, in the course of determining whether sexual abuse has
occurred.

No foundation was laid as to the trustworthiness of

the factual predicates upon which Dr. Palmer relied in forming
his opinion.

No foundation was given as to Dr. Palmer's qualifi-

cations in determining the occurrence of sexual abuse by oral
evaluations.

And finally,

no foundation was given to show why

Dr. Palmer would be more qualified to give an opinion as to
whether Lisa Lairby was telling the truth based on what she
said than would be the average juror.
The leap of faith required to accept Dr. Palmer's
opinion without further foundation is analogous to that discussed
by the court in Machera v. Garfield,

434 P.2d 756

(Ut. 1967).

During that case, which involved an automobile accident, an Ogden
City Police lieutenant was asked to give his opinion as to the
speed of a vehicle at the time of impact, based upon his examination of the damage to the vehicle.

The court refused to allow

the lieutenant's opinion because it was no more trustworthy than
would be the opinion of any one of the jurors when equally
informed as to the extent of damage to the vehicle.
759)

See also, Frye v. U.S.,

293 F 1013,

and Tice v. Richardson, 644 P.2d 490

- 13 -

(Id., at

54 App. D.C.

(Ks. 1983).

46

(1923)

The qualifying

of a witness as an expert does riot
immune from challenge.

r1·nJc r I is every conclusior.

U.S. v. Raqanu,

4'7•o

F.2d 4ln

(5th Cir.

1973); Tennessee Valley Authority v. An Eascn.c 1.t and R1qht •:>f
537 F.Supp 3 (E.D.Tenn.
opinion.

1981).

hd·

Such is the case· with Dr. Palr··cor'

There is no foundation in the record to show that a

pediatrician's "finding" of sexual abuse based solely on what thE
alleged victim said is trustworthy.

Furthermore, any supposed

probative value of Dr. Palmer's opinion was outweighed by its
prejudicial impact on the factfinder under Rule 45, Utah Rules
of Evidence.
Finally, Rule 56(2) Utah Rules of Evidence states in
part as follows:
"If the witness is testifying as an expert, testimony of the
witness in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to
such opinions as the judge finds are •... (b) within the
scope of the special knowledge, skill, experience or training possessed by the witness."
From the above authorities it is evident that Dr. Palmer's
opinion should

never have been admitted in evidence.

While the court admitted Dr. Palmer's opinion that a
particular witness was telling the truth based on what she said
to him (Tr. 221, lines 8-10; 229),

the trial court prohibited

defense counsel from eliciting an opinion on the same issue
from a licensed psychologist, Dr. Barbara Liebroder.

In the

words of the court:
"There is no law I know of that pcrrr.1 ts sof'lebody lo core,,
into this court and usurp the preroqat1ve of the Jury and
tell the jury whether or not someone is t<:ll1nc; the truth
or whether they are fantas1z1ng, or whethc1 they were able·
to influence someone else." (Tr. 467)
-

14 -

The above statemrnt by thr court is directly inconsistent with
the recent holding by thib c 0 urt in State v.
Utah s.ct., FctJ. lt., 1984, tlo. 17914, where a psychiatrist's
opir.ion concerninu the crrdii•ility
witness'

of

a witness and the

tendccr,cy to fantacize was held admissible.

The mere

fact that the conclusion of a qualified expert trenches upon a
jury issue does not compel its exclusion.
F.2d 1198 (5th Circ. 197CI).

U.S. v. Milton,

555

Where an expert's specialized know-

ledge with regard to a person's credibility or believability will
assist the tryer of fact,

such evidence is admissible

Miller, supra; U.S. v Hiss,

SS F.2d 559

(State v.

(S.D.N.Y. 1950))

The trial court also questioned the admissibility of
Dr. Liebroder's anticipated testimony due to an alleged psychologist-patient privilege (Tr. 460).

As generally recognized at

common law, however, suer. a privilege arises only when the purpose
of the examination was for giving curative advice or treatment,
and communications made to an examiner invited to the consultation at the opponent's instance is not privileged (City and County
of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 234 P.2d 26
Wigrnore,

Evidence (Chadbourne rev.)

(Cal. 1951);

Section 2382)

The record

shows that Wanda Lairby's psychological evaluation by
Dr. Liebroder was not for the purpose of curative treatment, and
it was at the instance of the defendants in this action (Tr. 340,
341).

No privilege ever arose concerning Dr. Liebroder's

examination of Wanda Lairby.

Neither was the court justified in

quashing the subpoena of Dr. Liebroder based on the alleged

- 15 -

insufficiency of the witness fee,

ace

in City anc

County of San Francisco v. Superior Court,
and authorities cited therein.
Although the court questioned tlte relevance and
materiality of Dr. Liebroder's anticipated testimony (Tr.

463)

the long-acknowledged legal standard with regard to relevance
and materiality of expert testimony is whether such testimony
would assist the jury in weighing the evidence.
Garfield,

434 P.2d 756

(Ut. 1967))

(Machera v.

Based on this standard,

Dr. Liebroder's psychological findings certainly would have been
relevant and material in assessing the credibility of Wanda
Lairby and any influence she may have exercised over her
daughter's testimony, as will be discussed shortly.

The quashal

of Dr. Liebroder's subpoena was a denial of Appellants' constitutional right to present evidence in their own behalf.
POINT VI
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS'
MOTION FOR A PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION.
A leading case on the issue of when a court should
order psychiatric examination of a complaining witness in a sex
offense case is Ballard v. Superior Court,
1966).

410 P.2d 838 (Cal.

The following passage from the Ballard opinion is relevant

at this point;
"A number of leading authorities have suggested that in a
case in which a defendant faces a charge of a sex violation
the complaining witness, if her testimony is uncorroborated,
should be required to submit to a psychiatric examination ...
In urging psychiatric interviews for complaining
in sex cases, some prominent psychiatrists have
-
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thut a wun1un c,1 CJl 1 J nai falsely accuse a person of a sex
crim0 ac-- 0 n_-ul\ cd d -er-t0J condition that transforms into
fcJt1ti1sy a '--1ecLful bic,JogirciJ urge.
Such a charge may likeflow from an
tEndency directed to the person
accused or from u rh1lJish desire for notoriety ••• Professor
Wigmore, ir1 a widely 4uc,tcd pC1ssage, stated, 'I"o Judge
shuuld ever let a sex offense charge go to the jury unless
the female compluinunt's socid] history and mental makeup
have been examined and testifiea to by a qualified physician
(cites omitted).' ..• Ti1i:o concerr, is sti'1l_ulated by the possibility that a believable complaining witness, who suffers
from an emotional condition inducing her belief that she
has been subJected to a sexual offense, may charge some
male with that offcnst.
Thus, the testimony of a sympathyarousing child may lead to the conviction of an unattractive
defendant, subjecting him to a lengthy prison term."
The standard adopted by the Ballard court,

together

with the maJority of courts who have dealt with this issue, was
that the trial judge should order a psychiatric examination of
the complaining witness in a

case involving a sex violation if

the defendant presents a
tion

(Id,

reason for such an examina-

at 91).
Evidence of a "corr.pelling reason" to order a psychiatric

evaluation of Wanda and Lisa Lairby

pursuant to defense counsel's

repeated motions is found throughout the trial record (see especially
Tr. 82,

84,

85,

86, 134,

136, 143,

150,

151, 157,

239)

!-.

brief

review of the record reveals that if ever there was a compelling
reason for a psychological evaluation in a sex offense action,
the case at bar was it.

Despite this widespread evidence of

influence upon Lisa Lairby's testimony at trial,

the trial judge

concludc:d that "there is nothing before the Court that indicates
that clnld was influenced in any manner whatsoever by her mother
as to her testimony."

(Tr. 124)

-
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While counsel acknowlcdyt'ei tl"
to order a psychiatric evaluation,

lrial court's discrcluJc,

it is the

Jefendant's puo:it

1

when faced with the compelling reasons as outlined herctoforL,
the court below abused its discretion in
motion for such psychiatric evaluation.
based its reasoning,
such motion,

defendant's
Although the court

in part, on lack of timeliness in making

the Supreme Court Clerk's Record on Appeal indicates

that Defendant's first motion for psychiatric evaluation occurrec
on July 11, 1981, almost one and a half years prior to trial
(Supreme Court Clerk's Record on Appeal, p. 9).
POINT VII
THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY ADMITTING ONLY A
PORTION OF A DOCUMENT TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT.
It is defendant's position on appeal that the court
below corrur,i tted reversible error in admitting only a portion of
a document which was highly prejudicial when admitted out of
context from the remaining portions of that document

(Tr. 619-658).

The confusion, indecision, and lack of direction at this point
the proceedings, as evidenced from the record, placed undue
emphasis on a highly prejudicial portion of a document which
should have been clearly inadmissible under Rule 45, Utah Rules
of Evidence to begin with.

When, however, the trial court

admitted the partial document into evidence the preJudicicJl
impact was aggravatedsir.cethe context from which the aJm1ttcd
statements were taken

was excluded.

that this was an abuse of discretion.
708,

713 (7th Cir. 1981)
-

lP -

It is Appellanls' positior
U.S. v. Walker, 652 F2d

POINT VIII
THE COURT ElEUJW COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY
ALLO\HtlG INTCJ EVIDEt1CE TE:STIMONY SO INHERENTLY
PROBABLE AS TO
TO NO EVIDENCE AT ALL.
Although the question of credibility is ordinarily one
for the tryer of fact,

that rule must give way when testimony is

viewed on appeal as incredible as a matter of law.
Quinones, 402 NYS 2d 196

(1978).

People v.

A reviewing court will overturn

the jury on the question of credibility of the witnesses when
evidence presented is so improbable, unbelievable, or unsatisfactory as to raise a serious question as to the guilt of the
defendant.

People v. Dunn,

365 NE2d 164 (Ill. App. 1977).

Generally, there must exist either a physical impossibility that
it is true, or its falsity must be apparent without resorting
to inferences or deductions.

People v. Duncan, 171 Cal. Rptr.

406, 115 C.A. 3d 418

See also, People v. Moore, 222

(1981).

NE 2d 95 (Ill. App. 1966); People v. Porter,
( I l 1.

422 NE 2d 213

App. 1981) .
The record of the trial court proceedings reveals that

several aspects of the uncorroborated testimony of Lisa Lairby
were inherently improbable.

For example, when asked,

"Do you

know how many times you were hurt at Tim 's house?", Lisa responded,
"Almost a hundred"

(Tr.

51).

Lisa also testified that "puke"

came out of Timothy Lairby's "winky" and that it looked like
"little green spots"

(Tr. 58), and that "it was yellow and brown

mixed, ... lots of yellow and brown"

(Tr. 155).

Lisa stated that

Timothy Lairby's winky touched "the inside" of her privates,
although Dr. Palmer, who examined Lisa, testified that there had
- 19 -

been nothing larger than 1/2 to 1 centirH
Lisa's vaginal opening (Tr.

236,

\•·t

in diameter penetrat,

237).

around Easter time in 1981 Mildred Lairby put thr tines of a
into her privates and caused her to bleed (Tr., 55), however,
Elmo Grewell, a hospital physician who exarnned Lisa on April 2r,
1981, testified that nothing had caused any bleeding in Lisa's
vaginal area (Tr. 15).

The above excerpts from Lisa's testimony

render her credibility seriously suspect.

Applying the afore-

mentioned legal standards of credibility to the testimony, the
court should conclude as a matter of law that Lisa's testimony
was inherently incredible, so much so that it raises a serious
question as to the guilt of the Defendants.

CONCLUSION

The record of the proceedings in the trial court below
proves that Appellants did not receive a fair trial.

They

denied their right to cross examination, their right

to present

\>:ere

evidence in their own behalf, and their right to effective
assistance of counsel.

Based upon the foregoing points and

authorities, the decision of the trial court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of May,

- 20 -

1984.
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